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Opium, Afghanistan’s leading economic activity, lies 
at the heart of the challenges the country faces in state 
building, governance, security, and development.  
With their narrow law enforcement focus and limited 
recognition of development, security, and political 
implications, current global counter-narcotics polices 
impose a heavy burden on Afghanistan. This paper first 
provides a summary overview of Afghanistan’s opium 
economy and the factors determining rural households’ 
decisions on cultivating opium poppy. It then discusses 
the dynamic evolution of the Afghan drug industry in 
recent years, in particular its consolidation around fewer, 
powerful, politically-connected actors and the associated 
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compromising of parts of some government agencies by 
drug industry interests. The paper reviews the experience 
with different counter-narcotics interventions, analyzes 
some proposals not yet tried in Afghanistan, and draws 
lessons and policy implications. Unfortunately there 
are no “silver bullets”—easy, quick, or one-dimensional 
solutions, and a longer-term horizon along with sustained 
commitment and resources will be required in order 
to phase out the opium economy over time. The paper 
concludes by putting forward some broad principles 
and approaches of a “smart strategy” against drugs in 
Afghanistan. 
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  The opium economy lies at the heart of the challenges Afghanistan faces in state 
building, governance, security, and development.  Accounting for around a quarter of 
total economic activity in Afghanistan, its magnitude and importance are virtually 
unprecedented in global experience.  Since 2002 efforts to reduce the size or even limit 
the expansion of the opium economy have failed.  In the meantime Afghanistan’s drug 
industry has evolved in directions which further exacerbate the threat it poses to the 
country’s entire state-building and development agenda.  Counter-narcotics measures—
designed largely in isolation from the other interventions, implemented in a fragmented 
and often piecemeal or inconsistent manner, and suffering by all accounts from 
widespread corruption during implementation—contained the seeds of their own failure. 
 
  This paper reviews the experience with counter-narcotics efforts in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, derives some lessons from this experience, and draws out implications for 
policy.  The main finding is that there are no “silver bullets” (easy or single-dimensional 
solutions) and that in order to have better prospects for success, the different counter-
narcotics instruments must be deployed in a much more intelligent way, with modest 
expectations and a long time horizon but strong and sustained commitment accompanied 
by adequate resources.  The broad principles and approaches of a “smart strategy” in 
response to the drug industry in Afghanistan are put forward. 
 
Since it deals with the opium economy in Afghanistan, this paper focuses very 
much on the supply side of the narcotics equation.  Although there are concerns about 
growing use of illicit narcotics in Afghanistan (see MacDonald, 2007), which are touched 
on in this paper, the main threat to the country’s development emanates from the 
cultivation, trade, and processing of opium and associated criminality and corruption.  
However, the difficulties in curbing the opium economy in Afghanistan are orders of 
magnitude greater because of the high world and regional demand for illicit opiates.   
Moreover, with their narrow law enforcement focus and limited recognition of 
development, security, and political implications, current global counter-narcotics 
policies impose a heavy burden on Afghanistan.  And finally, even if the country were 
able to make progress in reducing opium production, in the absence of broader changes 
on the demand side production would most likely shift elsewhere, as has been 
demonstrated by international experience. 
 
  The rest of this introductory section provides some historical background, 
summarizes Afghanistan’s opium economy from a development perspective, and 
highlights its strategic importance.  Section II outlines the structure of the opium 
economy and recent trends.  Section III analyzes determinants of opium poppy 
cultivation and the dynamic evolution of the drug industry.  Section IV reviews the 
experience with counter-narcotics interventions in Afghanistan since 2001.  Section V 
draws out some key lessons and puts forward implications for policy. 
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  The genesis and subsequent history of large-scale opium production in 
Afghanistan have been intimately linked with the wars and upheavals in the country and 
in the surrounding region during the last two decades of the 20
th Century.  Opium has 
been produced for a very long time in Afghanistan, but until the end of the 1970s this was 
traditional production on a small scale, largely limited to a few areas and primarily for 
local or regional consumption. 
 
The Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, the emergence 
of a theocratic regime in Iran in the same year, and the development of the opium 
processing industry in Pakistan (which also cultivated opium poppy at the time), as well 
as developments farther away (for example in Turkey), together created the enabling 
conditions for massive expansion of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.  Opium 
became a lucrative source of financing for the mujahideen resistance forces fighting 
against the Soviet occupation, and the linkages to processing facilities in Pakistan 
paralleled those between Afghan resistance forces and Afghan political parties in 
Pakistan that were sponsoring and supporting the resistance.  Iran’s abrupt elimination of 
opium poppy cultivation at the beginning of the Khomeini regime, Turkey’s shift to licit 
production, and Pakistan’s more gradual phase-out of opium poppy cultivation (while 
remaining a very important location for opium processing and the narcotics trade) 
provided “space” in the world market for Afghanistan to emerge as a major exporter of 
opium (including to meet Iran’s domestic consumption requirements).  Although reliable 
data are not available, it is clear that Afghanistan became a very significant opium 
producer by the mid-1980s. 
 
After the departure of Soviet forces in 1989 and especially after the collapse of 
the Najibullah regime in 1992, international financing for armed groups in Afghanistan 
was sharply reduced, further enhancing the relative importance of opium in providing 
funding for factions in the civil conflict which ensued.  The Taliban regime, which took 
over Kandahar and much of the south in 1994, conquered Kabul in 1996, and controlled 
some 90% of Afghanistan’s territory by the end of the decade, provided an environment 
in which opium production and trade could flourish.  Essentially treating it as a legal 
crop, the Taliban collected religious tax (ushr) on opium at a low rate, as in the case of 
other agricultural products.  Estimates of opium poppy cultivation, which were made on a 
more systematic basis by UNDCP (subsequently UNODC) starting from 1994, showed 
continuing increases to a peak of more than 90,000 hectares in the 1998/99 season, when 
Afghanistan accounted for close to 80% of total global illicit opium production. 
 
Before the 2000/01 growing season, in what turned out to be their final year in 
power, the Taliban regime effectively banned opium poppy cultivation (but not trade) in 
the territories it controlled.  While the motivation for this ban is subject to speculation, 
and major drug industry actors may have gone along with it in part because of oversupply 
and large stocks from previous bumper harvests, this was unquestionably the most 
successful and cost-effective short-run reduction in production of illicit narcotics 
achieved in history.  However, the sustainability of this blanket ban was very doubtful, 
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definitively one way or the other.  There is evidence that the ban hurt the Taliban 
politically, and planting of opium poppy resumed in the second half of 2001 in many 
places even before the end of the Taliban regime.  Moreover, during the ban opium 
poppy cultivation in the one province completely outside the Taliban’s control 
(Badakhshan) increased by an estimated 160%, with some heroin processing facilities 
reportedly also moving there. 
 
Thus the situation inherited after the downfall of the Taliban was one in which 
opium poppy cultivation had been almost completely eliminated in the previous year, but 
extensive planting of opium poppy was occurring, and within two years poppy cultivation 
and opium output were back to “normal” levels similar to those seen in the 1990s.  The 
high farm-gate price of opium induced by the Taliban ban, which persisted for several 
years, as well as efforts by drug industry actors to diversify beyond the main production 
areas in the south, led to the emergence of extensive opium poppy cultivation in non-
traditional growing areas in other parts of the country. 
 
Strategic Importance and Development Perspective 
 
  The opium economy is one of several critical issues facing Afghanistan.  It relates 
closely and in complex ways not only to the economic growth agenda and poverty, but 
also to state-building, the political process, governance, security, and counter-insurgency.  
The strategic integration of all these issues is essential for Afghanistan to make 
substantial and sustained progress in the face of a complex and inter-linked set of 
development challenges. 
 
The opium economy and the insurgency both thrive in an environment where 
there is insecurity, lack of rule of law, and a weak and corruptible state.  Thus even 
though their interests are by no means always intertwined, there are synergies between 
the Taliban and drug interests (including notably in Helmand province) that damage 
Afghanistan’s state-building agenda.  The close relationships between drug traders, 
warlords-turned-politicians, and corrupt officials in government agencies that have been 
partly compromised by the drug industry (for example the Police and Ministry of 
Interior) is another important example of the strategic linkages associated with the drug 
industry, discussed further in Section III. 
 
The opium economy provides substantial incomes to segments of the rural 
population, stimulates aggregate demand, and supports the balance of payments, although 
it has only secondary and indirect benefits for government revenue.  However, as argued 
by Martin and Symansky (2006), the opium economy’s macroeconomic impact is less 
than might be expected from its sheer size, because much income beyond the farm level 
never enters Afghanistan in the first place, and some goes right out again in the form of 
capital flight or import financing. 
 
  The opium economy is also contributing to the “Dutch disease” in Afghanistan by 
providing an influx of financial resources and driving up rural wages.  Labor in opium 
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returns that shifting to other, licit activities is discouraged.  Moreover, as it has become 
entrenched in some areas and has been a major economic activity for some two decades, 
the opium economy affects asset prices (most notably the price and rental/sharecropping 
rates for agricultural land in and around opium producing areas) and non-opium business 
activities.  However, even at present record levels of cultivation, opium poppy still takes 
up only a small proportion of Afghanistan’s agricultural land overall. 
 
In sum, the opium economy poses a complex development challenge.  On the one 
hand, it contributes heavily to local incomes; on the other hand, its illegality and 
associated corrupt and criminal activities undermine the basic institutions of the state.  In 
this context, poorly designed and implemented counter-narcotics measures can have an 
adverse development impact of a similar magnitude to the damage caused by the opium 
economy itself, possibly even greater.  The poverty impact of such measures—resulting 
from reductions in the incomes of farmers cultivating opium poppy (most of them 
sharecroppers or tenants on others’ land) and of wage laborers employed in opium poppy 
cultivation and harvesting—can be very significant.  Both the nearly nationwide Taliban 
ban of 2000 and the 96% reduction in the cultivated area for opium poppy in Nangarhar 
Province in 2005 exacerbated poverty, both directly and through opium-related debt and 
through coping strategies like asset sales, as well as through multiplier effects on the 
local economy.  Thus the development and poverty implications of both the opium 
economy and actions against it need to be fully taken into account in the development 
strategy and counter-narcotics strategy. 
 
II. THE OPIUM ECONOMY: OVERALL PATTERNS AND TRENDS 
 
  After looking briefly at data and research issues, this section summarizes our 
knowledge of the opium economy and recent trends.  Cultivation and production, trade 
and processing, opium prices, drug-related financial flows, and what little is known about 
the “commanding heights” of the drug industry are touched on.   
 
Data and Research Issues 
 
  Quantitative information on Afghanistan’s opium economy is limited and of 
varying quality and reliability.  This is not surprising given its illicit and informal nature, 
as well as the weaknesses of Afghanistan’s statistical system in general.  Moreover, 
logistical and security constraints seriously hinder the collection of primary data on the 
opium economy.  In addition there are technical issues, for instance related to the 
coverage and interpretation of satellite imagery.  And identification and assessment of 
trends is complicated by varying reliability and sometimes changing collection and 
estimation methodology for data over time. 
 
  Nevertheless, data on the opium economy are generally no worse, and in many 
respects better, than the data available on the rest of Afghanistan’s economy.  Estimates 
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1 on an annual basis using 
remote sensing supplemented by a survey, although estimates of yields (and therefore of 
opium production) are less reliable.  Opium price data also are collected on a regular 
(monthly) basis in an increasing number of provinces.  Moreover rural households, 
smaller drug traders, and hawala (informal money transfer) dealers have been accessible 
for careful interviewing and information collection.  Thus overall, data issues have not 
prevented meaningful research on Afghanistan’s opium economy (see Byrd and 
Buddenberg, 2006, p. 4). 
 
Cultivation and Production 
 
  Keeping in mind data limitations, summary information on opium in Afghanistan 
is presented in Table 1.  Among the various estimates, those of the total area under opium 
poppy cultivation are the most reliable but still have significant margins of error.
2  Yield 
estimates have a greater margin of error, particularly when disaggregated to the 
provincial level.  Compilation of the estimated farm-gate opium price introduces a 
further, though likely smaller, margin of error, so the end result is that the estimated 
farm-gate income has a considerably larger margin of error than the cultivated area 
estimate.  Assumptions about border prices, from which the total potential export value 
and (as a residual) the gross income beyond the farm level are calculated, introduce 
substantial further unreliability into these numbers. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Afghanistan’s Opium Economy 
  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Production (tons)  2,300 3,300  185  3,400 3,600 4,200 4,100 6,100 8,200 
World Market share (%)  ~52  70 11 74 76 87 87 92 93 
Number of provinces producing 
opium 
8  22 11 24 28 34 26 28 21 
Area under opium poppy 
(thousand ha) 
54  82  8  74  80  131 104 165 193 
As % of total agricultural land  n/a N/a n/a n/a 1.6 2.9 2.3  3.65  4.27 
Area under poppy / Area under 
cereals (%) 
2.0 3.2 n/a 3.2 2.8 5.9 n/a n/a n/a 
Gross farm income per ha (US$)  1,000 1,100 7,400  16,200  12,700  4,600 5,400 4,600 5,200 
Gross potential value of opiate 
exports (US$ million) 
n/a  850  n/a  2,500 2,300 2,800 2,700 3,100  n/a 
Gross farm income from opium 
(US$ million) 
50 90 60  1,200  1,000  600  560  760  1,000 
Downstream income in 
Afghanistan (US$ million) 
n/a  760  n/a  1,300 1,300 2,200 2,140 2,340  n/a 
Source: UNODC (2003); UNODC and Government of Afghanistan (2004, 2006, 2007). 
 
                                                 
1 The US also produces annual estimates of the total area devoted to opium poppy cultivation, which in recent years 
have been fairly similar to UNODC’s estimates.  However, there are wide discrepancies between US and UNODC 
estimates of the opium poppy cultivated area in individual provinces.  For convenience and consistency, UNODC 
estimates are used throughout this paper. 
2 For example, in the case of the 2004 estimate of 131,000 ha of opium poppy cultivation, UNODC (2004, p. 21) 
indicated that the “range” of possible estimates was from 109,000 ha to 152,000 ha, implying a margin of error (90% 
confidence interval) of around plus or minus 16-17%.  In 2006 the range of estimates was somewhat smaller, between 
150,000 ha and 180,000 ha, for a margin of error of plus or minus 9% (UNODC, 2006, p. 115). 
  6  Amid annual fluctuations, total national opium poppy cultivated area has shown a 
generally rising trend since the early to mid-1990s, interrupted by the Taliban ban which 
almost wiped out the 2001 harvest, and reaching new peaks in 2006 and 2007.  Estimated 
opium production shows broadly similar trends, although percentage changes differ, 
reflecting fluctuations in estimated opium yields.  Estimated gross income per hectare 
and gross farm income rose very sharply after the Taliban ban (reflecting a supply shock-
induced spike in prices, shown in Figure 2 later in this paper), and even after half a 
decade remain considerably higher than in the 1990s.  This may reflect in part a higher 
risk premium in farm-gate prices as a result of criminalization of the opium economy and 
intensified (albeit fragmented and uneven) counter-narcotics efforts. 
 
  National cultivation trends mask major diversity across provinces, selected 
examples of which are shown in Figure 1.  Cultivation estimates for some provinces tend 
to move together (at least fluctuating in the same direction), often with somewhat 
offsetting changes from year to year.  In other cases, fluctuations across provinces are 
partially offsetting within a year.  In 2005 for example, the year in which cultivation in 
Nangarhar Province declined by 96% due to a largely effective ban on cultivation 
imposed by the provincial authorities, cultivation in Kandahar and Balkh rose sharply and 
in Farah it more than quadrupled, largely offsetting the impressive decline in Nangarhar.  
There is also great diversity at local (district) level and, as demonstrated by extensive 
fieldwork, across households, although regularities in the parameters influencing 
decisions on opium poppy cultivation are evident  
 

















Source: UNODC (2003, 2004, 2006, 2007). 
 
Trade and Processing 
 
  Less is known about the trade in opium in and around Afghanistan, its conversion 
into refined products (morphine and heroin), and trade in these products.  Nevertheless a 
rough picture can be gleaned from field research and interviews with (mostly smaller) 
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neighboring countries.  It is worth emphasizing that unlike many other agricultural 
products, opium is a durable good, with a shelf life of several years—longer than heroin 
powder.
3  This means that sizable inventories of opium can be and are maintained, that 
opium can be and is used as a form of saving and even as “currency”, and that 
speculation in and sizable capital gains and losses on opium inventories can occur with 
fluctuations in prices.  In fact, observed changes in prices and smoothing of supplies in 
major consuming countries can be explained only by large adjustments of opium 
inventories in the face of fluctuations in production. 
 
  There are many thousands of smaller opium traders, typically operating on a part-
time and seasonal basis (e.g. shopkeepers).  At this level opium markets have been 
characterized by frequent entry and exit, and higher opium prices following the Taliban 
ban attracted more small traders into the opium business.  Trade margins for smaller 
traders are relatively low, except where proximity to or crossing of borders results in 
significant risks of interdiction and associated risk premia.  Research suggests that drug 
traders often have a background trading in licit goods, and that they do respond to 
financial incentives and risks in their decision-making about whether and how much to 
trade in opium and opiates.  Based on fieldwork the most important source of risk for 
traders has been price fluctuations, although more recently the risk of seizure or theft by 
authorities appears to have increased (Pain, 2006b). 
 
Moving up the “pyramid” of the drug trade in Afghanistan, fewer and fewer, and 
individually increasingly important, actors are involved (see Shaw, 2006, p. 204), 
culminating with no more than several dozen key traffickers at the top.  There are 
important linkages between higher-level elements in the drug industry and some warlords 
and their militias, as well as with government officials and some of the figures active in 
the conflict-affected politics of Afghanistan. 
 
  There are no signs that the drug industry is a monolithic cartel or is functioning 
like a cartel in pricing or other behavior, but entry at the middle and upper levels, and in 
some areas even at the lower levels, is becoming more difficult (Pain, 2006b, and Shaw, 
2006).  In addition, there are signs of cooperation and “regulation” which indicate that 
when it is in their interests, different elements of the drug industry can work together 
effectively, including across ethnic lines.  By the same token, although some of the 
fighting in the south as well as elsewhere may be explained in part as drug-related 
conflict, all-out “drug wars” between criminal gangs of the kind seen in some other 
countries appear not to have been the norm in Afghanistan. 
 
  Finally, the span of control and influence of even the major Afghan drug traders 
does not appear to extend very strongly or far beyond the borders of Afghanistan.  Prior 
to the early 1990s, the bulk of opium produced in Afghanistan was processed into 
morphine or heroin in neighboring countries, mainly Pakistan.  In recent years, however, 
                                                 
3 Opium dries out over time, which reduces the weight, but there is a well-established price differential between stored 
“dry” opium and freshly-harvested “wet” opium, so that any loss in value is minimal, especially in relation to the large 
observed fluctuations in opium prices. 
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large part Pakistan’s efforts to drive out heroin processing labs from its territory, which 
culminated in the mid-1990s (see MacDonald, 2007, pp. 86-87).  As in the case of opium 
poppy cultivation itself, heroin processing activities have gravitated toward Afghanistan 
where the “enabling environment” in the form of insecurity, lack of rule of law, 
protection provided by armed militias, etc. remains conducive for such activities.   
However, after drug shipments cross the border, other trafficking groups, associated with 
the neighboring countries or more transnational in nature, appear to take over. 
 
Price Patterns and Trends 
 
Considerable data on opium prices are available (see UNODC, 2003 and 2006) 
and can be analyzed, albeit with caution.  It should be noted that the farm-gate opium 
price comprises only a small part of the price of opiates at Afghanistan’s borders, and a 
truly minuscule percentage of the wholesale or retail price in OECD consuming countries 
(Byrd and Jonglez, 2006, pp. 130-131). 
 
  As shown in Figure 2, there have been major fluctuations in prices of raw opium, 
most notably the sharp spike in prices associated with the Taliban ban.
4  T h i s  w a s  
followed by persistence of high prices for several years.  More recently, farm-gate opium 
prices have declined but have remained at levels still well above those prevailing in the 
1990s, despite large increases in production in the face of limited increases in global 
demand.  This suggests that the “risk premium” associated with opium poppy cultivation 
may have risen considerably, probably reflecting criminalization along with significant 
albeit patchy and haphazard enforcement efforts including eradication, and likely greater 
extortion of “protection money” from farmers by various authorities.  However, prices 
are currently being pushed down by the very large increases in output in 2006 and 2007. 
 
Figure 2: Dry Opium Prices in Kandahar and Nangarhar, 1997-2006 (US$/kg) 
 
Source: Byrd and Jonglez (2006, p. 120). 
                                                 
4 It should also be noted that there are large short-run fluctuations in local opium prices—lasting hours or at most 
days—which are not captured in the monthly price data.  These fluctuations reflect entry and exit of major buyers from 
local markets and substantially increase short-run trading risks for small traders (see Pain, 2006b). 
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  Quantitative analysis of farm-gate opium prices, which makes use of several 
instruments ranging from simple correlation coefficients to linear regression and more 
sophisticated co-integration techniques (see Byrd and Jonglez, 2006), indicates that: 
•  Opium markets are flexible and mobile; while actions against the opium economy can 
be effective locally and in the short run, they encourage shifts of production and trade 
to other areas. 
•  Regional and, in particular, cross-border price differentials suggest that interdiction of 
opium trade, particularly at borders, can have a significant impact. 
•  Available price data indicates that internal opium markets appear to have been more 
“integrated” (based on a technical definition of the term) during the 1990s than in 
recent years, perhaps reflecting the disruptive effects of counter-narcotics actions on 
opium markets. 
•  Price data for recent years suggest that Helmand/Kandahar in the south is functioning 
as a “central market” for opium in Afghanistan. 
 
Drug-related Financial Flows 
 
  The bulk of drug-related financial flows within Afghanistan, and also to and from 
neighboring countries (primarily Pakistan), occur through the ubiquitous hawala 
(informal financial transfer) system.  Hawala is based on informal yet very solid 
networks of trust and business relationships, under which money transfers in opposite 
directions are offset against each other, and any remaining imbalances are settled through 
transfers between dealers (see Maimbo, 2003). Very little physical transfer of money 
needs to occur, hawala dealers can operate effectively with small cash reserves, and the 
system is remarkably efficient (as evidenced by small spreads in exchange rates quoted). 
 
Recent analysis based on extensive interviews with hawala dealers (Thompson, 
2006) provides insights into the nexus between the drug industry and hawala, and the 
considerable variation across different parts of the country.  In the economically less 
developed province of Badakhshan, for example, field research indicates that at certain 
times of the year close to 100% of the liquidity in the hawala system is derived from 
drugs.  On the other hand, in a much more developed province like Herat, only 30% of 
the hawala market’s overall transaction volume appears to be linked to drugs, although 
the analysis of such linkages is complicated by use of drug money in the legitimate 
import business.  In addition to being a center of opium production and trade, the 
southern region (Helmand and Kandahar provinces) is a focal point for money 
laundering: apparently about 60% of hawala flows are drug-related, and 80-90% of 
hawala dealers are involved in drug-related money transfers. 
 
  Beyond Afghanistan’s borders, Dubai appears to be a central clearing point for 
international hawala activities, and various cities in Pakistan also are major transaction 
centers.  Even payments for drug shipments to Iran enter Afghanistan from Pakistan.  
Transfers of funds from major drug consuming countries to regional countries like Dubai 
and Pakistan appear to occur largely through the formal banking system; hawala becomes 
dominant in the onward transfers of funds into and within Afghanistan. 
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 The  hawala system plays other important roles in addition to drug money 
laundering.  Its positive contributions include serving as an efficient vehicle for 
remittances both during the long period of conflict and more recently; providing money 
transfer services in the many parts of Afghanistan where no banks exist; participating in 
foreign exchange and nascent treasury bill markets; and playing an instrumental role in 
the successful introduction of a new, stable currency for Afghanistan in 2002-2003. 
 
III. DYNAMICS OF THE OPIUM ECONOMY 
 
Determinants of Household Decisions 
 
  Since opium poppy is an annual crop, rural households in Afghanistan make 
decisions every year on whether to plant opium poppy, how much to plant, and how to 
organize the required labor and other inputs, as well as on when and how to sell (or store) 
the output.  Relative to its high value, opium poppy economizes on land and water use 
(although it requires decent, non-waterlogged soils and adequate water at the right times), 
but it is highly labor-intensive, and skilled labor is at a premium during harvest time.  
Market linkages for sale of the raw opium harvested are very strong (especially as 
compared with those for licit agricultural products), and drug traders also can make 
available key inputs—in particular credit and seeds—as necessary.   
 
Extensive fieldwork conducted during the past decade has provided valuable 
insights into the various factors influencing rural households’ decisions on opium poppy 
cultivation.  The best of this research (notably by Mansfield, Pain), undertaken at great 
personal risk, has built up a significant degree of longitudinal knowledge—of provinces, 
localities, and even some households, as well as a wealth of cross-section information.   
 
This research reveals that, although farm-gate prices of opium provide signals for 
producers and are a major determinant of incomes (see Byrd and Jonglez, 2006), a one-
dimensional price-based model of farm-level decision-making with respect to opium 
poppy cultivation does not fit the facts found in fieldwork, or even the broad trends seen 
in aggregate data.  Changes in cultivation patterns at household and locality levels 
respond to many factors, of which the farm-gate price of opium is only one (albeit a very 
important one).  These factors are intimately related to the development challenges 
confronting Afghanistan, and they highlight that a counter-narcotics strategy can only 
succeed if it is nested in and consistent with a broader development strategy. 
 
However, eradication efforts and enforced production reductions sometimes do 
have major price effects that significantly affect cultivation decisions.  Particularly if the 
reduction in cultivation is very large (exemplified most strikingly by the Taliban ban in 
2000/01), the associated increase in farm-gate opium prices can be quite sharp (more than 
1,000 percent in the short run at the time of the Taliban ban).  This sends a very strong 
market-based signal for expansion of opium poppy cultivation in areas where the ban 
does not apply (non Taliban-controlled areas in the case of the Taliban ban) or is not 
enforced.  High prices also encourage areas with more marginal potential to engage in 
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2006b and Mansfield, 2006). 
 
Household assets play a key role in guiding cultivation decisions, as argued by 
Mansfield (2006, 2007a).  These assets, broadly understood, include the number of able-
bodied males and their labor skills (e.g. in opium poppy harvesting), agricultural land, 
irrigation water, proximity to labor markets, and jobs that pay regular salaries (e.g. in 
government), as well as more conventionally defined physical assets (e.g. livestock, 
vehicles).  Households with relatively few such broadly defined assets have fewer (if any) 
viable alternatives to opium poppy cultivation or engaging in wage labor in the opium 
economy.  More asset-rich households, on the other hand, have more choices and 
opportunities for viable licit livelihoods and hence will tend to be much less dependent on 
opium, even though they may cultivate poppy opportunistically to increase their incomes.  
The implication is that law enforcement efforts as well as political and moral pressure can 
encourage better-off households to eschew involvement in the opium economy. 
 
Access to commodity markets also can be viewed as an “asset” which reduces 
households’ dependence on opium.  The growth and extension of local vegetable markets 
in areas of Nangarhar close to Jalalabad city provide a good example of how improved 
access to markets can lead to sustainable reductions in opium cultivation.  There is also 
evidence of such factors at work near other provincial capitals, cities, and transport 
routes. 
 
Another broadly defined “asset”, which is important but affects a locality or area 
rather than households individually, is a modicum of security for persons and property, at 
least sufficient to conduct small-scale economic activities and transport agricultural 
produce.  The massive expansion of opium poppy cultivation in southern Helmand 
province occurred when the Taliban insurgency there was intensifying, and other 
examples demonstrate the linkage between insecurity and opium at a more micro level 
(see Mansfield, 2007c for a study of two districts in Badakhshan province in this regard). 
 
Mansfield (2006 and 2007a) finds evidence of the importance of such assets in the 
initially successful effort to sharply reduce opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar 
province in 2004/05.  The Nangarhar opium ban has turned out to be largely sustainable 
in more central localities where most households are higher up along the asset spectrum 
and in particular have relatively good access to commodity and labor markets, and have 
shifted successfully and on a sustainable basis to licit economic activities.  In fact, after 
an adjustment period usually of not more than 2-3 years at most, such households can 
actually become better-off than when they had been cultivating opium poppy, in 
particular by taking advantage of a combination of different production and labor market 
opportunities available when household labor is freed up from labor-intensive opium 
production. 
 
However, more remote areas where households have fewer assets suffered 
severely from the ban and by the third year have been reverting to opium poppy 
cultivation.  In the worst-off areas the ban was not fully implemented from the beginning.  
  12Forcing households and localities that lie toward the lower end of the asset spectrum to 
forego cultivating opium poppy has led to drastic coping responses like asset sales, 
migration, and the like, which increase rather than reduce their underlying dependence on 
opium.  Given their very meager assets and limited alternatives, the opportunity cost for 
such households of engaging in opium poppy cultivation is very low, and their decisions 
in this regard may not be affected by law enforcement actions or pressures 
 
Erosion or loss of some of the assets discussed above often constitutes an 
important “push” factor for households to become engaged in the opium economy.  For 
example, in studying the main opium-producing areas in the northern province of Balkh, 
Pain (2006a and 2007) points to local population growth (including through return of 
displaced persons), and running down of irrigation systems which reduces water 
availability, as having made opium poppy cultivation a relatively more attractive 
alternative as compared with other crops.  In the case of Ghor Province, loss of livestock 
due to the severe drought of the late 1990s was an important factor for both traders and 
farmers to become involved in the opium economy.  Declining security in southern 
Helmand Province since 2005 appears to have been an important factor contributing to 
massive expansion of opium poppy cultivation in that province. 
 
Historical and social factors also play a significant role in cultivation decisions.  
Pain (2007) argues that basic structures (agro-ecology, settlement history, and ethnicity 
of a locality), the social positions of individuals within a locality (including ethnicity 
within the local context and socio-economic position), and intermediary factors 
(community, markets, institutions, and behavior) together influence decisions on opium 
poppy cultivation (see Pain, 2007, Figure 1, p. 7).  While recognizing that market-based 
price signals can encourage wider diffusion of opium poppy cultivation, as appears to 
have occurred in Balkh Province post-2001, he argues that informal “regulation” of 
markets and ethnic or other linkages with the drug trade play an important role.  In 
particular, pre-existing ethnic or other ties that facilitate the drug trade and transfer of 
labor and techniques comprise another enabling factor.  For example, ethnic Pashtuns 
who had been transplanted to Balkh decades earlier, but who retained ties with their 
tribes/ethnic group in the southern opium-cultivating provinces, facilitated the spread of 
opium poppy cultivation to Balkh (see Pain, 2006a).  Moreover, existing trading 
networks for other goods, irrespective of ethnic connections, can help facilitate the opium 
trade when conditions are right.  Pain (2006b) documents how many opium traders in 
Ghor had their origins in the livestock trade, which dried up as herds were decimated in 
the late 1990s due to the severe and protracted drought. 
 
Broader Drug Industry Dynamics: Changing “Vicious Circles” 
 
We now turn to dynamic patterns and trends in the drug industry as a whole.  
Figure 3 depicts a vicious circle involving the opium economy, warlords, and 
insecurity—broadly reflecting the situation as opium production rebounded in the first 
two years following the downfall of the Taliban. In this situation, payments from the 
opium economy strengthened warlords, who in turn undermined the state, while drug-
related corruption also undermined the state directly. In return for payments, warlord 
  13militias helped provide the enabling environment (often including armed protection) for 
the opium economy to operate.  The weak government was unable to provide genuine 
security or rule of law, and this created a good environment in which the opium economy 
could continue to thrive.  Thus the dynamic tendencies at work would perpetuate a large 
opium economy and a weak, ineffective state (particularly in terms of providing security). 
 
Figure 3: The Vicious Circle of the Drug Industry 
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  This vicious circle suggested that a multi-faceted strategic framework would be 
needed to effectively address the opium economy and the problems it causes for 
Afghanistan’s development agenda. In addition to reducing the size of the drug economy 
through effective counter-narcotics measures more narrowly construed, this framework 
would have needed to include: (i) curbing warlords’ powers by stopping payments and 
other support to them, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) to take 
away their militias, and co-opting them into the Government as appropriate; (ii) building 
government capacity and effectiveness as well as resources; and (iii) reform and capacity 
building in the security sector (see World Bank, 2005, Figure 7.4, p. 127).  A strategic 
framework along these lines appeared attractive, and several of the key elements were in 
place to some extent or at least initiated.  However, improvements at the broader strategic 
level fell far short of what was needed.  As a result, there has been massive further 
growth of the opium economy, and both the opium problem and its adverse impacts on 
the state building and development agenda have become worse. 
 
As depicted in Figure 4, the transformation of warlords into politicians has been 
accompanied by compromising of parts of some government agencies like the Ministry of 
Interior and Police by drug industry interests. The strengthening triangle between drug 
interests, their political and other sponsors, and parts of the government reflects a trend 
that—primarily through widespread corruption in their implementation—counter-
  14narcotics efforts have inadvertently contributed to drug industry consolidation (see Shaw, 
2006).  Security forces, most notably the police, are in part facilitating the activities of the 
drug industry rather than countering it.  
 
Figure 4: Consolidation of the Drug Industry 
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Overall, this dynamic evolution of the drug industry constitutes a profound threat 
to Afghanistan’s state-building and development agenda.  And the fundamental equation 
between a weak state (partly compromised by drug interests) and a thriving opium 
economy remains.  Moreover, the expanding Taliban insurgency in the South (not 
depicted in Figure 4) adds complexity to the picture and helps provides an enabling 
environment of insecurity for the drug industry, further exacerbating the associated risks. 
 
IV. COUNTER-NARCOTICS EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Afghanistan has a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), first prepared in 2003 
and subsequently updated and refined several times, most recently in January 2006.  The 
goal, priorities, and pillars of the NDCS are outlined in Box 1.  There is much to be 
commended in the NDCS, including its explicit emphasis on the need for a multi-year 
time horizon and for sustainable progress against drugs, the importance of alternative 
livelihoods being available in order for eradication to play its role in the counter-narcotics 
strategy, the rejection of aerial and chemical spraying, etc.  However, the NDCS is not 
specific on short-run prioritization and sequencing, regional targeting, or on the lessons 
learned from earlier experience with counter-narcotics efforts.  Nor have adequate 
resources been allocated (or even estimated) for proper implementation. Annual detailed 
Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plans, which provide more operational guidance in 
the short run and are organized around the pillars of the NDCS, lack the strategic 
  15linkages, synergies, response to diversity, prioritization, and sequencing that is necessary 
to make the counter-narcotics strategy work effectively. 
 
Exper
rior to their ban, the Taliban treated opium de facto as a legal 
ommodity.  Moreover, the Taliban ban applied to opium cultivation but not to trade in 
pium 
 experience provides 
seful lessons for the future.  Below are brief summaries of experience with each of the 
ain co
rops in the field.  In fact, where 
arp reductions in cultivation were achieved, physical eradication accounted for only a 
consequence, most of the limited physical eradication of poppy crops that has occurred 
 
Box 1: National Drug Control Strategy—Objective, Priorities, Pillars 
iew 
inating the basis for the trade. 
and Regional Cooperation; (3) Alternative Livelihoods; (4) Demand 
inal Justice; (7) Eradication; and (8) Institution Building 
Comments: 
The NDCS, which has gone through several versions and is expected to be revised again in the fall of 2007, puts 
forward a credible multi-dimensional approach, which is briefly summarized below. 
Overall Policy Goal: 
To secure a sustainable decrease in cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs with a v
to complete and sustainable elimination. 
National Priorities: 
elim I.    Disrupting the drugs trade by targeting traffickers and their backers and 
nd diversifying legal rural livelihoods.  II.   Strengthening a
III.  Reducing the demand for illicit drugs and treatment of problem drug users. 
IV.  Strengthening state institutions both at the centre and in the provinces. 
tivity:  Pillars of Ac
(1) Public Awareness: (2) International 
Reduction; (5) Law Enforcement; (6) Crim
Source: Afghanistan Government (2006). 
ience with Different Counter-Narcotics Instruments 
 
Until the Taliban’s comprehensive and (in the short run) highly successful opium 
poppy cultivation ban imposed in 2000, counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan were 
very marginal, consisting primarily of some small-scale alternative development projects 
of a pilot nature. P
c
o and opiates. 
 
  Efforts to shrink the size of the opium economy in the post-Taliban era have been 
significant but fragmented and detached from the development agenda, and unevenly 
applied over time and across the country.  Given also the entrenched nature of the opium 
economy, it is no surprise that counter-narcotics efforts have failed to prevent the large 
increases in opium production seen in recent years.  However, this
u
m unter-narcotics instruments deployed so far in Afghanistan. 
 
  Eradication and enforced cultivation reductions.  This category includes 
reductions in opium poppy cultivation achieved through pressure, persuasion, and threat 
of eradication as well as from outright eradication of c
sh
very small proportion of the decrease in cultivated area. 
 
  The two main instruments for physical eradication of opium poppy fields have 
been the Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) and so-called “Governor-led 
eradication” implemented by police and other forces at the provincial level.  The CPEF 
has limited capacity, often faces local resistance, and, lacking local knowledge, has to 
rely on local guidance with respect to where to focus its eradication efforts.  As a 
  16has been under the leadership of provincial Governors.  There are serious concerns 
however that due to the close ties between many local officials and drug interests, 
overnor-led eradication is especially vulnerable to corruption in implementation. 
 
on has been a 
ecessary condition to achieve reductions through pressure and persuasion. 
e Taliban ban, and in other 
rovinces at the time of the dramatic reduction in Nangarhar. 
 
are 
uite mobile in response to the changing geographical focus of counter-narcotics 
measur
oreover, such corruption tends to result in eradication disproportionately 
ffecting the poor, who lack political connections or resources to pay bribes to avoid 
eradication. 
                                                
G
The vast bulk of reductions in opium poppy cultivation have been achieved 
through pressure and persuasion, including passing down orders through the provincial 
and district administrations of the government as well as traditional village and higher-
level committees of elders (shuras).  Religious arguments, building on the widespread 
popular perception that opium as a narcotic drug is “against Islam”, have often played an 
important part in such campaigns.  However, the credible threat of eradicati
n
 
  Overall, eradication generally has not had a sustainable impact.  Within 2-3 years 
after the nearly complete cessation of cultivation almost nationwide under the Taliban in 
2000/01 and in Nangarhar Province in 2004, poppy cultivation in both cases rebounded.  
Moreover, even at the time of the respective bans, cultivation increased sharply in other 
areas—in Northern Alliance-controlled areas in the case of th
p
There are three main reasons for the limited success of eradication.  First, 
eradication is technically difficult.  The opium economy has amply demonstrated that it is 
“footloose” both across space and over time, with impressive reductions in opium poppy 
cultivation being offset by increases in other areas and/or in subsequent years.
5  As 
opium poppy is an annual crop, cultivated on well under 10% of Afghanistan’s irrigated 




The second reason is political resistance to and corruption in the implementation 
of eradication programs.  The unpopular Taliban ban undermined political support for the 
Taliban in key Pashtun areas, possibly making it easier for the regime to be overthrown in 
late 2001. The Government’s campaign against drugs in 2004/05, led by President 
Karzai, which achieved by far its greatest success in Nangarhar Province, also carried 
significant political costs for the Government, especially in that province.  Adverse 
popular sentiment about eradication can lead to a political reaction, which in the 
Afghanistan context can be exploited by anti-government interests and by the drug 
industry itself.  Corruption in implementation aggravates these political repercussions, 





5 It should also be noted that like other crops, opium poppy is best rotated from time to time to maintain soil quality and 
high yields.  Thus a “stop-go” pattern whereby there are sharp reductions in a province or locality in one year followed 
by a rebound in subsequent years often makes agronomic sense.  The widespread reports of an excellent opium harvest 
in Nangarhar Province, in the third year after the near-complete ban imposed in 2004, provide a striking example. 
6 See Anderson (2007) for an  interesting account  of a particular case where political and/or corruption considerations 
obviously influenced and constrained eradication efforts with adverse consequences. 
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  The third reason is that eradication does not address the deeper determinants of 
opium poppy cultivation.  More sustained success with eradication and enforced 
cultivation reductions has occurred in localities or provinces that were relatively new to 
opium poppy cultivation (e.g. Wardak Province in 2004) or that were better-off in terms 
of access to resources, assets, and opportunities (e.g. central areas of Nangarhar and other 
provinces).  Based on experience in Afghanistan, eradication and enforced reductions in 
cultivation are economically unsustainable, except in better-off localities where people 
already have viable alternative livelihoods—including access to water, land, and 
commodity and labor markets.  When imposed on poorer areas and households lacking 
opportunities for viable licit economic activities, eradication can exacerbate poverty and 
increase the underlying dependence on opium.  At the level of individual households, this 
comes about through reduced incomes, forced asset sales, in some areas opium-related 
debt (see Zia et al, 2005), and other coping mechanisms, which weaken coping capacities 
and resilience, making it more likely that farmers will subsequently return to opium 
poppy cultivation.  For example, there are cases reported of farmers whose opium poppy 
fields have been eradicated several times but who nevertheless continue to cultivate 
opium poppy because this is the only way they can manage (and have any hope of 
ducing) their opium-related debts.   
 
 and undermining the credibility of the government 
nd others involved in eradication. 
 
s a hostile 
ct against it, further driving a wedge between the people and the government. 
 
re
Overall, the experience with eradication indicates that although it attacks the most 
visible part of the opium economy and sometimes achieves visible and quantifiable 
results in the short run, these results are not sustainable.  Moreover, eradication often has 
adverse consequences, perversely exacerbating the underlying dependence of many rural 
households on the opium economy
a
In this context, it should be emphasized that the shortcomings of eradication are 
multiplied when chemical spraying is involved—especially aerial spraying—as opposed 
to manual or mechanical eradication as employed hitherto in Afghanistan.  Patterns of 
human settlement and inter-cropping mean that it would be very difficult to avoid some 
impact on people, livestock, and other crops from chemical spraying.  Even if the actual 
health and other effects are not significantly harmful, chemical spraying would provide a 
propaganda victory for anti-government interests.  In a context where infant and child 
mortality rates are extraordinarily high, where there are frequent crop failures, and where 
livestock suffer from numerous diseases, all such problems encountered for many years 
to come could be blamed on chemical spraying.  The insurgency undoubtedly would take 
advantage of what would be widely perceived by the affected rural population a
a
  18  Interdiction.
7  Interdiction efforts in Afghanistan were limited at first.  From 
2003 onward, however, there has been considerable emphasis on interdiction, including 
destruction of heroin processing facilities.  Strong efforts have been made to build up 
police forces, train judges for special counter-narcotics courts, and set up prison facilities 
for drug traffickers.  These activities are having some impact, although it has not been 
possible to go after the larger actors in the drug industry. However, corruption in the 
implementation of interdiction activities is a serious issue.  Cases have been reported of 
drug traders being arrested but then released in return for a payment, and of their drug 
shipments being confiscated, not for destruction but for onward sale by corrupt local 
authorities, including the possibility of returning part of the shipment to the trader 
concerned for an additional payment (Pain, 2006b).  Implemented in a corrupt manner, 
interdiction actions as well as eradication have been inadvertently contributing to 
consolidation of the drug industry around fewer, powerful, and politically  connected 
actors (see Shaw, 2006).  Clearly, enforcement activities have been used by some local 
and regional power-holders to favor their own (if they are directly involved in the drug 
industry) or allied drug industry interests. 
 
  Alternative livelihoods.  These frequently debated programs (see Mansfield, 
2007b for a review) aim to assist farmers to shift from opium poppy cultivation to 
alternative sources of income.  The earliest efforts involved simple “crop substitution” 
projects, which subsequently gave way to “alternative development” approaches.   
Although somewhat broader, these still focused on substituting other crops for opium, 
concretely involving relatively small-scale, localized rural projects.  Given the economic 
and social forces that lead to opium poppy cultivation as discussed earlier, such projects 
were grossly inadequate.  Even in cases where they were successful in narrow terms, they 
tended merely to displace illicit drug cultivation elsewhere.  The shift to an “alternative 
livelihoods” concept was meant to encompass these broader factors, including access to 
assets like land, water, and credit, as well as markets.  But this conceptual improvement 
has not been translated into practice, as alternative livelihoods programs have continued 
to focus on discrete projects mainly involving other crops.
8 
 
Many recent efforts to attack the development roots of opium poppy cultivation 
have not only been narrow, but also far too short-term in their orientation.  They have 
been used to try to (partly) mitigate the immediate income declines suffered by rural 
households that exit from the opium economy.  Key examples include cash-for-work 
programs and provision of agricultural inputs (typically seeds and fertilizer).  Focused on 
short-run incomes and not encompassing markets, assets, and financing, these programs 
do not change the long-run and deeper conditions that contribute to households’ decision 
to cultivate opium poppy.  Indeed, abundant research since the 1990s has demonstrated 
                                                 
7 This general category encompasses the full range of law enforcement measures beyond the farm level, including 
arrest of drug traders, seizure of drug shipments, closing of opium bazaars, and destruction of heroin processing 
facilities, as well as actions against drug industry sponsors whether inside or outside the government.  Internationally, 
the term “interdiction” is often reserved for law enforcement efforts against movements of illicit narcotics across 
borders, in particular interception of drug shipments on their way to or in consuming countries, whereas actions against 
all levels of the drug industry in producing countries may be lumped together as production and refining controls.  In 
this paper, interdiction refers to law enforcement actions against drugs beyond the farm level. See Ward and Byrd 
(2004, pp. 57-60) for a summary discussion on interdiction up until 2004. 
8 See Mansfield and Pain (2005) for an extensive discussion on the use and misuse of the term “alternative livelihoods”. 
  19that a short-run “quid pro quo” approach does not work (Mansfield, 2002), but 
nevertheless it continues to be widely used.  Moreover, the approaches taken have been 
counter-productive, since promises have been made and popular perceptions 
consequently have arisen that these programs would deliver immediate results.  The 
inevitable failure to meet such unrealistic expectations has discredited the government, 
donors, and the counter-narcotics strategy more generally. 
 
Initiatives to articulate and implement a broader, more long-run development 
approach as part of a counter-narcotics strategy have continued through “mainstreaming” 
of the counter-narcotics dimension in development activities, national development 
programs in particular.  It is hoped that in this way development programs can have an 
enhanced and scaled up counter-narcotics impact, while avoiding “doing harm” (i.e. 
inadvertently supporting expansion of the opium economy).  For example, as defined by 
the World Bank (2006) in its mainstreaming guideline note for Afghanistan, 
mainstreaming involves factoring opium considerations into all aspects of the World 
Bank’s engagement with Afghanistan, including analytical work and policy dialogue. 
 
  Demand side interventions in Afghanistan.  While high demand along with 
criminalization comprises a critical enabling factor for the illicit narcotics industry at the 
global level and there is large regional demand for opiates in countries near Afghanistan, 
domestic demand within Afghanistan is very small relative to the size of the opium 
economy which is predominantly an export-oriented activity.  Nevertheless, there are 
clear signs that problem drug use is a significant and increasing problem in Afghanistan, 
spurred by chronic insecurity and conflict, as well as by return of refugees who became 
drug users in neighboring countries.   
 
Demand-side issues have been neglected in Afghanistan, although recently more 
attention has been devoted to them, including due to concerns about HIV/AIDS 
transmitted by intravenous drug users.  Resources devoted to demand reduction in 
Afghanistan have been minuscule as compared with those devoted to eradication and 
interdiction.  While demand measures will not have a significant impact on the size and 
importance of the opium economy since it is overwhelmingly an export activity, they will 
be important in reducing the adverse impact on problem drug use in Afghanistan. 
 
  Communications and education.  This is another neglected area, except that 
where successes have been achieved in reducing opium poppy cultivation through 
pressure and persuasion, communications down the line within government, and between 
local administration and village shuras (groups of elders), have played an important role.  
There are widespread indications from fieldwork that communications by radio and via 
mosques have been effective in making it clear to the rural population that opium poppy 
cultivation is illegal and may be subject to eradication.  However, communication efforts 
have failed to manage expectations about delivery of development assistance and on the 
contrary have tended to fuel such expectations. 
 
Moreover, based on anecdotal evidence it appears that other communication 
efforts have at least sometimes gone far off the mark, reflecting lack of sensitivity to the 
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(e.g. most of the rural population is illiterate), etc.  A striking example is discussed by 
Mansfield (2007c, p. 28), where being unable to read, people looking at a counter-
narcotics poster gave widely varying interpretations unrelated to the intended message.  
For example, no one saw an armed, turbaned young man in the poster as a terrorist or 
insurgent (which was the intended depiction), as people with such clothing and carrying a 
weapon would be a normal part of the local scene. 
 
V. LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
  As discussed earlier, eradication and enforced cultivation reductions, as well as 
hasty and fragmented alternative livelihoods projects, have been major elements of the 
counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan in recent years.  The country’s rich experience 
provides ample evidence that these are problematic instruments that carry significant 
adverse side effects.  The key lesson is that there is no substitute for effective rural 
development over the longer term in weaning rural populations away from dependence 
on opium poppy cultivation.  This has major implications for the design, time horizon, 
time profile of funding, and sequencing in relation to eradication of development 
activities intended to contribute to counter-narcotics objectives.   
 
“Better” Counter-Narcotics Instruments Are Not in Themselves Solutions 
 
  In addition to these hard-learned lessons about eradication and alternative 
livelihoods, experience in Afghanistan also has demonstrated that other counter-narcotics 
instruments, which appear far more attractive for valid reasons, are not in and of 
themselves solutions to the opium problem. 
 
  Emphasizing interdiction rather than eradication:  This approach is attractive on 
a number of grounds.  First, the number of “targets” is several orders of magnitude 
smaller than the number of opium poppy cultivating farmers.  If an equivalent impact can 
be achieved by interdiction actions against a relatively small number of drug traffickers 
as in a large eradication campaign, interdiction would be much more cost-effective from 
a technical perspective.  Second, rather than criminalizing farmers this option can target 
the elements of the drug industry that constitute the major threat to Afghanistan’s state-
building, governance, and development agenda.  Third, interdiction is likely to increase 
the “wedge” between farm-gate and downstream prices, potentially even reducing farm-
gate prices in the short run, thereby discouraging cultivation.
9  In contrast, eradication 
tends to increase farm-gate prices.  Finally interdiction, if effectively implemented in an 
even-handed manner, can enhance the government’s credibility by going after criminal 
elements rather than farmers and wage laborers. 
 
  Despite these attractive features, interdiction is far from a panacea.  Significant 
figures involved in politics and government may be involved in or beneficiaries of the 
drug industry.  A serious interdiction effort is therefore likely to give rise to political 
                                                 
9 There is some evidence of such a negative effect on farm-gate prices from threatened or actual interdiction measures 
(see Ward and Byrd, 2004). 
  21resistance by powerful actors.  Institutional development and capacity building in the 
concerned law enforcement agencies is essential, which will take time.  And resources, 
albeit of a much lower magnitude than required for the other instruments, are needed on a 
sustained basis.  Moreover, as seen from the experience of other countries such as Iran, 
interdiction can elicit strong and effective responses by the drug industry, ranging from 
armed resistance against police to assassinations, bribery and corruption, and political 
manipulations.  Thus although it can reap important benefits in the short run—not least 
by sending strong signals of the government’s commitment against the drug industry, a 
counter-narcotics strategy driven by interdiction can trigger an increasing spiral of drug-
related violence.  And finally, as in the case of eradication, implementation of interdiction 
measures in an uneven and corrupt manner not only harms the credibility and perceived 
legitimacy of the government but also can be a vehicle for consolidation and 
strengthening of the drug industry. 
 
Interception of Precursor Chemicals:  While transforming opium into morphine 
is a straightforward technical process with fairly simple requirements, processing opium 
into heroin is more sophisticated and requires precursor chemicals, most notably 
substantial amounts of acetic anhydride.  With most opium produced in Afghanistan 
currently being processed in-country (a sharp contrast with the situation in the 1990s and 
earlier), interdicting and disrupting the flow of precursor chemicals into Afghanistan is 
often advocated, and may be seen by some as a relatively straightforward solution.   
However, Afghanistan’s porous borders and the inability of the international community 
to stem cross-border flows of arms, insurgents, and illicit drugs themselves (including in 
the past large quantities of raw opium) suggest grounds for caution.  Moreover, acetic 
anhydride is widely used for other purposes in many countries.  And finally, since 
precursor chemicals account for a very small proportion of the price of heroin at 
Afghanistan’s borders, even successful efforts to disrupt their supply and sharp increases 
in their prices will not necessarily curb heroin processing.  Recent fieldwork suggests that 
with the unprecedented large opium harvests in 2006 and 2007, prices of these chemicals 
have risen sharply, but their cost still comprises a small proportion of the price of heroin 
in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and higher prices do not appear to be a 
significant obstacle to availability of the chemicals and to heroin processing. 
 
Proposed Solutions That Have Not Yet Been Tried in Afghanistan 
 
  There are a number of other proposals for dealing with Afghanistan’s opium 
problem that have not yet been tried in the country.  Unfortunately none of these 
approaches are “silver bullets,” either. 
 
  Licensing Production:  Not yet tried in Afghanistan, although strongly advocated 
in some quarters, is the idea of licensing the country’s opium production for sale and 
processing in the legal market for pharmaceuticals.  This already occurs in some other 
countries, most notably Australia, France, India, and Turkey.  However, only India 
produces licensed opium by labor-intensive techniques similar to those currently used in 
Afghanistan; the other countries grow poppy straw rich in pharmaceutical ingredients 
using capital-intensive modern agricultural techniques.  There are clear international rules 
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the government and stringent controls to prevent leakages into the illicit market.   
Opportunities for engaging in licensed production are supposed to be open to 
“traditional” producers of opium, a status for which Afghanistan would appear to qualify 
but this would need to be confirmed. 
 
  Unfortunately, although superficially attractive, the proposal for licensed 
production of opium in Afghanistan founders on several basic practicalities. 
•  The security, rule of law, and governance situation in Afghanistan is nowhere 
near adequate for licensed and effectively controlled production of opium.  India, 
with a much better security, rule of law, and governance situation and 
internationally accepted control mechanisms in place, suffers from substantial 
leakages of opium from the licensed into the illicit market, estimated at around 
30% (see Mansfield, 2001).  In Afghanistan leakages could only be expected to be 
much larger. 
•  More specifically, and given that only a small proportion (under 10%) of 
Afghanistan’s good agricultural land is devoted to opium poppy cultivation, if the 
current level of production is licensed, the same amount of illicit production could 
spring up within a couple of years (i.e. total opium output very easily could 
double in a fairly short period of time). 
•  The licensed price inevitably would be far lower than the price of illicit opium, 
reinforcing incentives for leakages and parallel production for the illicit market. 
 
  Even if these problems could be resolved, which does not appear feasible in the 
foreseeable future, there are equally daunting obstacles from the international side: 
•  Stocks of licensed opium produced by India with labor-intensive techniques are 
building up.  Moreover, Afghanistan and indeed India do not appear to have a 
comparative advantage in licit cultivation (see figures cited in Mansfield, 2007b)  
Thus the scope for large licensed production by Afghanistan using current 
techniques would appear to be limited. 
•  More generally, although some have argued that there is a worldwide shortage of 
opiates for licit purposes like pain management in developing countries, this is 
subject to debate.  Any shortage would not appear to be at all near the magnitude 
that could accommodate Afghanistan’s recent or current production of illicit 
opium.  Thus for licensed production of opium in Afghanistan to be accomodated 
from a demand perspective, the existing licensed producing countries would need 
to sharply reduce their output.  But there is no sign of any willingness on their 
part to do so. 
 
Buying Up the Opium Crop:  A somewhat similar proposal is that the 
international community, rather than putting large amounts of money into counter-
narcotics measures of doubtful effectiveness, should simply buy up the opium crop for 
one or two years as an interim solution.  In addition to avoiding problems associated with 
eradication and other enforcement measures against the opium economy, this measure is 
seen as temporarily disrupting the drug trade and sharply reducing funding available for 
criminal and anti-state interests, as well as buying some time for development of 
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need to be accompanied by a crash program to develop viable legal livelihoods in opium 
poppy cultivating areas.  
 
Although in some respects attractive, this proposal is problematic because, as 
discussed earlier, strengthening and diversifying legal livelihoods takes a long period of 
time, so buying the crop for only one or a few years will not do much good.  Moreover, it 
would set in motion incentives that, as in the case of licensed production, would stimulate 
further growth of opium poppy cultivation.  If it involves a commitment to buy all of the 
opium that is produced, costs would likely mount from year to year (or otherwise 
increasing amounts of opium would go back into illicit channels). And there are a host of 
technical issues like pricing which would not be straightforward to resolve, and would 
affect production incentives and potential for leakages.  Finally, the public sector 
apparatus, presence, capacity, and level of governance required for this approach to be 
feasible administratively are not in place.  Thus this proposal would not have lasting 
benefits.  Moreover, by setting a precedent of the government and international 
community getting engaged in the purchase of opium, it would send very mixed signals 
to farmers as well as generating problematic incentives.   
 
  Blanket Agricultural Subsidies / Support Prices:  Another “silver bullet” which 
has not been tried in Afghanistan but is sometimes proposed is a subsidy / price support 
scheme for crops planted instead of opium.  This option is seen as stimulating the 
development of licit crops to substitute for opium, and also as providing income support 
for former poppy farmers during a transitional period until their new cropping patterns 
get firmly established on a financially viable basis. 
 
  This proposal also raises a number of very serious issues.  As has been amply 
demonstrated by Afghanistan’s experience opium is footloose, so such a subsidy or 
support price system would need to cover the entire country in order to be effective.  This 
would add greatly to its cost, and moreover would involve putting in place a national 
subsidy or price support system that Afghanistan would be unable to come anywhere near 
to affording on its own in the foreseeable future.  And most of the poor in Afghanistan, as 
in many other developing countries, are net purchasers of grain, so depending on how it 
is designed this might well not be pro-poor in its impact.  Moreover, based on 
international experience, agricultural subsidies and support price systems tend to be self-
perpetuating, and they become politically difficult to terminate once they are put in place.  
Given the shortage of domestic revenue in Afghanistan and other development priorities, 
how long could the international community credibly commit to providing blanket 
subsidies or financing price supports? 
 
  Another important question is what crops would be subsidized and how they fit 
into Afghanistan’s development agenda.  Wheat is by far the most important agricultural 
product and tends to be the crop of choice for farmers who stop cultivating opium poppy, 
but wheat is not the crop of Afghanistan’s future.  As a low-value, relatively land- and 
water-intensive, and not labor-intensive crop, wheat does not mesh well with 
Afghanistan’s resource endowment.  Moreover, in good years Afghanistan already comes 
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no export prospects for wheat in the region given that several neighboring countries are 
themselves sizable producers and exporters (including to Afghanistan).  What 
Afghanistan needs to develop instead in the agricultural sector for non-opium rural 
development is high-value, labor-intensive licit crops with good export potential 
(including through agro-processing). 
 
  Finally, Afghanistan’s porous borders, and the same kinds of governance and 
security issues that affect some of the other proposals discussed earlier, would make a 
blanket subsidy or price support scheme virtually impossible to implement.  The large 
production of wheat in neighboring countries, most notably Pakistan (where there is a 
subsidy on wheat flour) and Kazakhstan, would add further complications and risks.   
Costs would likely increase, and trade patterns would be further distorted. 
 
Toward a “Smart Strategy” against Drugs in Afghanistan 
 
The lessons from experience with different counter-narcotics instruments in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere, and the discussion above of other proposed solutions to the 
opium problem, clearly demonstrate that there are no easy answers.  On the one hand, 
high global demand for illicit opiates shows no sigh of diminishing.  On the other hand, 
the conditions that lead farmers to cultivate opium are deep-seated and not possible to 
change rapidly, or inexpensively.  Moreover, many of the commonly proposed 
“solutions” could actually worsen the situation.  However, while calling for modest 
expectations in the short run and for exercise of caution, this is not a recipe for inaction.  
As emphasized earlier, the opium economy is simply too important and too harmful to 
Afghanistan to neglect or downplay.  Even though the illegality of the opium economy 
and high global demand for illicit opiates are likely to persist for the foreseeable future, 
experience does provide some grounds for hope that strategies exist that can reduce 
opium cultivation in Afghanistan. 
 
Experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere suggests the following principles to 
guide the development of a “smart strategy” against drugs in Afghanistan (see Byrd and 
Buddenberg, 2006).  One is to focus efforts against those parts of the drug industry that 
pose the greatest danger to the nation and its development agenda—i.e. the larger drug 
traffickers and their sponsors, who threaten to undermine state building through political 
corruption and compromising of state agencies like the Police and Ministry of Interior.  
These actors, not the farm households engaged in opium poppy cultivation and/or wage 
labor in the opium economy, constitute the real threat. 
 
  A second principle is to take fully into account the adverse side effects and 
distortions induced by counter-narcotics instruments, which could undermine or even 
negate any beneficial effects.  A prime example is corruption in the implementation of 
counter-narcotics policies.  There is no point in designing a plan that may work well but 
only if there is no corruption, when it is obvious beforehand (and based on experience) 
that there will be corruption in implementation. 
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narcotics assistance (especially support for alternative livelihoods activities) is 
concentrated in the major opium-producing areas, other (non-cultivating) areas are likely 
to resent this and may even weaken their efforts to keep out the opium economy.
10  More 
generally, experience suggests that counter-narcotics efforts should not focus excessively 
on the major current opium producing areas but rather consider strong measures to 
discourage the spread of the opium economy to non-dependent provinces and localities. 
 
  A fourth principle is to respond to the diversity in the rural opium economy, based 
on the expanding body of knowledge that is being built up, and to exploit opportunities 
based on local resources, accessibility of markets, and improvements in security and 
governance.  In areas where people have some assets (including not least in the form of 
able-bodied labor), there are land and water resources, commodity and labor markets are 
accessible, and there is a modicum of security and half-decent governance, it is possible 
to get away from dependence on the opium economy.  Moreover, when these ingredients 
are in place, the shift from opium to sustainable licit livelihoods can occur within a few 
years.  Where such essential resources, assets, and opportunities are not present in a 
locality, there is no alternative to longer-term rural development which inevitably will 
take much time to achieve. 
 
  Finally, it is essential to continue to monitor and build information and knowledge 
about the evolving opium economy, to engage in sound and careful policy analysis, and 
to utilize the findings of research and the lessons from experience in the design and 
implementation of counter-narcotics measures. 
 
  Based on these principles, a smart strategy against drugs in Afghanistan could 
include the following key elements. 
 
  With respect to eradication and enforced reductions in poppy cultivation, these 
should be focused on the better-off and new opium producing areas.  Experience in such 
areas (for example with eradication in Wardak Province, a new opium producing area) 
suggests that these measures can be successful and have a sustained impact.  When a 
locality is targeted for eradication on such a basis (the province is usually too big a unit 
for this purpose, but the district or sub-district level would be more appropriate), the 
target should be complete or near-complete rather than partial elimination of opium 
poppy cultivation in that locality—this will minimize the risk of corruption in 
implementation and associated distortions.  Chemical spraying, especially aerial spraying, 
should be avoided for reasons explained earlier in this paper. 
 
  With respect to interdiction, and recognizing the political difficulties involved, 
these efforts should be focused against medium and larger drug traffickers and their 
sponsors. In addition to causing disruption of the drug trade in the short run, this will set 
a very positive example for counter-narcotics efforts at lower levels.  Given the weakness 
of the judiciary and the difficulties in successfully prosecuting major drug figures 
                                                 
10 Some provincial governors have publicly stated that their provinces, which are not significant opium producers and 
don’t face major security problems, are not getting much development assistance. 
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courts and in training personnel), actors associated with the drug industry should at least 
be removed from their positions in government, which can have a significant impact in 
the Afghan context.  Aside from the direct benefits, this will also send a strong signal of 
credibility for the counter-narcotics strategy. 
 
With respect to alternative livelihoods, do not throw money at short-term 
alternative livelihoods programs but rather support sensible rural development, fully 
understanding that this will take time.  Resources for effective rural development will 
need to be scaled up as sound programs are developed and refined through field 
experience.  Lessons from international experience with rural development should be 
brought to bear in this regard.  Part of the rural development effort could involve support 
for promising high-value horticultural products, such as almonds, raisins, pistachios, and 
others, as well as livestock products.  Many of these goods would need to be exported, 
and innovative approaches to developing exports using the international and Afghan 
private sector could be explored for this purpose. 
 
Mainstreaming of the counter-narcotics dimension in development programs is 
very important and will help in scaling up meaningful efforts on the development side. 
Mainstreaming should not be approached mechanically but rather in a flexible and 
results-oriented manner.  And while moving forward expeditiously with necessary 
technical and support work to make mainstreaming a reality, expectations about progress 
in the short run should be kept modest. 
 
As emphasized earlier, don’t concentrate efforts and resources too much in the 
main opium producing areas, but rather consider a kind of “containment” strategy to 
progressively close off increasingly large parts of the country from vulnerability to 
dependence on opium.  Over time, this will help narrow the geographical scope and range 
of the drug industry and restrict its response options to counter-narcotics measures. 
 
Finally, and more generally, just as the counter-narcotics dimension needs to be 
mainstreamed in development programs, there is also a need to fully mainstream the 
development dimension in counter-narcotics strategy and actions.  Given the 
importance of the opium economy in Afghanistan, this kind of “reverse mainstreaming” 
of development and governance considerations in decisions, policies, and instruments for 
fighting against drugs is essential.  In particular, it could help avoid problems like those 
encountered in the recent past when counter-narcotics measures have been designed and 
implemented in isolation from the broader development and state-building agenda. 
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